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CIVIL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK: HOUSING PART D

·------------

-X

INDEX#: 77511/18

116 AVENUE C INVESTORS LLC,

DECJSION I ORDER
MOTION SEQS. 3 & 4

Petitioner-Landlord,
-against-

HON. KIMON C. THERMOS

DAVID A. WRIGHT,
Respondent-Tenant,
-and-

"JOHN DOE" and "JANE DOE",
Respondents-Underte11ants.

-------------·- ----------

x

Recitation, as required by CPLR §2219(a), of the papers considered in review of the instant motions.
Papers
Numbered
Notice of Motion, Affinnation, Affidavit and Annexed (Ex. A-E) ...........................................1
Notice of Cross-Motion, Affirmations, Affidavit and Annexed (Ex. A-X) ............. .... .. .. ........ .... 2
Affinnation in Opposition to Respondent's Summary Judgment Motion and Annexed (Ex. A-D) .....3
Affmnation and Affidavit in Opposition to Petitioner's Summary Judgment Motion ..... ... .... ... .... .4
Reply Affirmation and Annexed (Ex. A-D) ................................................................................ 5
Supplemental Affirmation in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion and in Support of Respondent's
Motion and Annexed (Ex. A) ............. ............................................. .................. ..........6
Supplemental Affirmation in Opposition to Respondent's Motion and in Support of Petitioner's
Motion ....................................... .................... :.................................................... 7

Appearing for Petitioner: Schneider Buchel, LLP, By: Mary T. Lucere, Esq.
Appearing for Respondent-Tenant: Himmelstein, McConnell Gribben, Donoghue & Joseph, LLP,
By: William Gribben, Esq.
Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision/Order on this motion and cross-motion is as
follows:

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner commenced this nonpayment proceeding in November 2018, see.king possession of the
alleged unregulated apartment based upon $89,888.10 in rent and additional rent due from October 2016
through November 2018 at $3,250.00 per month. The petition, which indicates that the apartment is a
cooperative or condominium, states that the apartment is not subject to the Rent Stabilization Law of
1969 as amended ("RSL"), since it was deregulated due to high rent vacancy as the rent exceeds
$2,500.00 per month. On or about September 27, 2018, Respondent-Tenant David Wright ("Respondent")
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was served with a ''Notice of Default, Ten (10) Day Notice to Cure and Notice of Intention to Tenninate
Proprietary Lease''. The Notice of Petition and Petition were served upon Respondents on or about
November 19, 2018.
On November 27, 201 8, Respondent, by counsel, filed an answer asserting as affirmative
defenses, inter alia, that the petition improperly alleges that the apartment is not subject to the RSL;
improper deregulation; that the rent sought in the petition is not the legal rent; rent overcharge; and that
the predicate "Notice of Default" improperly seeks to terminate a proprietary lease where Respondent is
not a proprietary lessee and the building was never converted to a cooperative or condominium and, thus,
the predicate notice is fatally defective. Respondent-Tenant also asserts counterclaims for rent overcharge
and legal fees pursuant to RPL §234.
Respondent now mo"'.es for an Order, pursuant to CPLR §3212, determining that the subject
apartment is rent stabilized and granting summary judgment in his favor on his rent overcharge and legal
fees counterclaims. Respondent took possession of the subject apartment in 2004, with a monthly rent of
$2,000.00, pursuant to an unregulated lease with a prior owner of the subject premises. Respondent
argues that the subject apartment was improperly deregulated, since the New York State Division of
Home and Community Renewal ("DHCR") rent registration records notes that the apartment was
registered as exempt, as a "NYC COOP/CONDO'', on July 12, 2000, but the subject building was never
converted into a cooperative or condominium. He argues that the legal regulated rent for the apartment
should be set at $73.50, the last properly registered rent in 1999, until the DHCR records are corrected.
Respondent further argues that, when Petitioner purchased the subject building in 2015, it knew that the
building was not converted into a cooperative or condominium, yet Petitioner willfully did not amend the
DHCR registration filings for the subject apartment. As such, Respondent contends that Petitioner acted
fraudulently and has further failed to provide any justification for the increase in the monthly rent from
$73.50 in 1999 to $2,000.00 in 2004, such as improvements to the apartment or a DHCR Order affecting
the rent.
Petitioner opposes the motion and cross moves for an Order, pursuant to CPLR §3212, granting
summary judgment in its favor, awarding a judgment of possession and warrant of eviction against
Respondent and awarding money judgments for the rent due and legal fees in its favor. According to
Petitioner, there were two prior owners of the subject premises before it acquired ownership in September
2015 and, thus, it cannot be held liable for the acts of the prior owners. Petitioner denies any fraud and
contends that the indications in its predicate notice, petition and DHCR registration filing that the subject
premises is a cooperative or a condominium are harmless clerical errors. Petitioner argues that the subject
apartment was properly deregulated because, at the time of its deregulation in 2000, the monthly rent for
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the apartment was at or over the deregulation threshold of $2,000.00 in effect from 1997 through June 23,
2011 .
DISCUSSION

It is well settled that summary judgment is a drastic remedy and cannot be granted where there is

any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue of fact or if there is even arguably such an issue. Andre v
Pomeroy, 35 N. Y.2d 361 (1974). The function of the court is to detennine whether any issues of fact exist

that preclude summary resolution of the dispute between the parties on the merits. Consolidated Edison
Co. v Zebler, 40 Misc.3d 1230A (Sup. Ct. NY 2013); Menzel v Plotniclc, 202 A.D.2d 558 (2nd Dept.
1994). The court must accept, as true, the non-moving party's recounting of the facts and must draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Warney v Haddad, 237 A.D.2d 123 (1st Dept.
1997); Assajv Ropog Cab Corp. , 153 A.D.2d 520 {1st Dept. 1989). The movant must submit admissible

evidence to demonstrate primafacie entitlement to summary j udgment as a matter of law and the absence
of any issues of fact that require a trial. Zuckerman v City ofNew Yorlc, 49 N. Y.2d 557 (1980); Winegrad
v New York Univ. Med Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851 (1985); Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 N. Y.2d 320 (1986). The

movant' s failure to make such a showing mandates denial of summary judgment, regardless of the
sufficiency of the opposing papers. Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., supra; Alvarez v Prospect
Hosp., supra. Once a primafacie showing has been made, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to

submit admissible evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. Giuffrida v. Citibank Corp., 100
N. Y. 2d 72 (2003); Zuckerman v. City ofNew York, supra. The opponent of a summary judgment motion

has the burden of laying bare its proof in admissible fonn to establish that there remains a material issue
of fact that requires a trial. Grullon v. City of New York, 297 A.D.2d 261 (ls1 Dept. 2002) and Di Sabato v.
Soffes, 9 A.D.2d 297 (r1 Dept. I 959).

In the case at bar, this Court grants that branch of Respondent's motion seeking an Order
determining that the apartment is subject to the RSL. As such, this Court hereby finds that the subject
apartment was improperly deregulated and, therefore, remains rent stabilized. Petitioner has failed to
demonstrate that the apartment was properly deregulated in light of the fact that the subject premises was
admittedly never converted to a cooperative or a condomini um and no admissible evidence was submitted
to justify the increase in the monthly rent from $73.50 in 1999 to $2,000.00 in 2004, such as
improvements to the apartment or a DHCR Order affecting the rent.
Contrary to Petitioner's contention, the statutory limitation under CPLR §213-a only applies to
rent overcharge damages, not for determining whether the premises was improperly deregulated.
Appellate authority has consistently held that there is no statute of limitations barring examination of an
apartment's rent history, when the purpose is to address a challenge to the regulatory status of the
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premises and the mode of its deregulation. Gersten v. 56 7'h Ave. LLC, 88 A.D.3d 189 {App. Term t"

Dept. 2001).

~re, given this Court's findings that the subject apartment was improperly deregulated and

remains subject to theRSL, Petitioner's cross..:mQtiorueeki.ng,,summ~ent in its favor is denied
an'Ci'Respondent's current monthly reEt is hereby fro n at $73.50, which is tb~ amount of the last legal
..

regulated rent accordfog to the DHCR records and, thus, the most recent reliable registered rent, until
~
Petitioner corrects the DHCR rent registrations. HSTPA. Part F, §2 and §5; Jazilek v Abart Holdings,

--

--

LLC, 72 A.D.3d 529 (ls' Dept. 2010). See also, NYC Administrative Code §26-517(e} and 9 NYCRR.
§2528.4(a); Matter ofSecond 82nd SM LLCv New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 2012
NY. Misc. Lexis 1577 (Sup. Ct. NY 2012) and Ernest & Maryanna Jeremias Family Partnership, LP v
Matas, 39Misc.Jd1206A (Civ. Kings 2013).
As to those branches of Respondent's motion seeking summary judgment in his favor on his rent
overcharge and legal fees counterclaims, this Court must deny those requests as Respondent has not
demonstrated prima facie entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law and the absence of any
issues of fact that require a trial. Zuckerman v City ofNew York, supra.; Winegrad v New York Univ.

Med Ctr., supra.; Alvarez v Prospect Hosp. , supra. [Notwithstanding, contrary to Petitioner's contention,
although it was not the property owner when the subject premises was improperly deregulated in 2000, a
new residential property owner can be held liable for rent overcharges by a prior owner under a carryover liability theory. RSC §2526. 1(f)(2)(i)] .
Since neither Respondent's rent history from 2004 through present nor all of Respondent's
admissible receipts from 2004 to present reflecting actual payments made to Petitioner were submitted
herein, there remain triable issues of fact as to whether Respondent was overcharged and, if so, the extent
of the overcharge, especially since HSTPA now requires the court, in determining whether there has been
a rent overcharge, to "consider all available rent history which is reasonably necessary to make such
determinations." HSTPA, Part F, §2 and §5. In addition, triable issues of fact remain as to whether the
DHCR registration filing indicating that the subject premises was exempt as it was a cooperative or
condominium and the failure to correct such filing was hannless clerical error as Petitioner alleges or a
fraudulent scheme to destabilize the subject apartment.
CPLR §213-a, as amended by HSTPA, states that "[n]o overcharge penalties or damages may be
awarded for a period of more than six years period before the action is commenced or complaint is
flied ... " HSTPA, Part F, §6. Similarly, RSL §26-516(aX2), as amended by HSTPA, states that "a
penalty of three times the overcharge shall be assessed upon all overcharges willfully collected by the
owner starting six years before the complaint is filed." HSTPA states that the statutory amendments "shall
take effect immediately and shall apply to any claims pending or filed on or after" the effective date of tbe
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Act. HSTPA, Part F, §7. Since Respondent's overcharge claim herein was pending on HSTPA's
effective date, the amendments made therein apply to this proceeding. Therefore, if the trier of fact finds
that no fraud is involved, the look back period for determining any overcharge damages would begin six
years prior to November 27, 201 8 (the base date), when Respondent fi led his answer in this action, which
includes a rent overcharge counterclaim. Thus, the look back period for detennination of overcharge
penalties and damages would be limited to six years prior to the base date of November 27, 201 8, to wit:
November 27, 20 12.
However, if the tr ier of fact fmds that fraud is involved, HSTPA provides, in pertinent, part:
"The divis ion of housing and community renewal, and the courts, in investigating complaints of
overcharge ... shall consider all available rent history which is reasonably necessary to make such
determinations ... Nothing contained in this paragraph shall lim it the examination of rent history
releynot to a determination as to: (i) whether the legality of a rental amount charged or registered
is reliable in light of a ll available evidence inc luding. but not limited to. whe ther an unexplained
increase in the registered or lease rents, or a fraudu le nt sche me to destabilize the housing
accommodation. rendered such rent or registration unreliable ... " HSTPA. Part F, §2.
As such, examination of the rent history before November 27, 2012 would be allowed, without limit, for
the purpose of determining whether there was a fraudulent scheme to destabil ize the housing
accommodation, s ince the rent on during the six-year look back period from the base date would be
unreliable.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Respondent's motion is granted, in part, and denied, in part, as explained herein;
and Petitioner's cross-motion is denied, in its entirety.
The parties are directed to appear on January 30, 2020, at 9:30 a.m., in Pa11 D, Room 524, for
settlement or lrial.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.
Dated: December 23, 2019
New York, New York
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